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In this chapter it will be argued that in order to understand the willingness of many 
states to recognise Kosovo as a new state, an act that flies in the face of the post-war 
consensus on the illegality of secession
1
, we need to return to the 1998-99 Kosovo 
crisis and address the dynamics that informed foreign intervention at that time. We 
will argue that this intervention was motivated as much by a self-determination 
imperative – whereby foreign powers sought a detailed realignment of the Yugoslav 
constitution – as by humanitarian concerns. 
Much of the literature on foreign intervention in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (‘the FRY’)2 at the time of the 1998-99 Kosovo3 crisis addressed both the 
nature of the intervention and its length in fairly narrow terms. In respect of the latter 
issue, the intervention was generally taken to have begun with NATO’s aerial 
bombardment which commenced upon 24 March 1999 (with the bombardment, if not 
the intervention, ending on 10 June 1999); while in terms of the nature of the 
intervention, debate about the legality and/or the justifiability of NATO’s bombing 
campaign has largely revolved around its construction as a purported instance of 
‘humanitarian intervention’, thereby confining the debate concerning both the nature 
and the legitimacy of western activity within the by now well-established discourse on 
humanitarian law. The sides of this debate aligned roughly as follows: on the one 
hand there were those who have sought to justify the air assault by arguing that it was 
essential to prevent a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ in terms of refugee movements 
resulting from a campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ orchestrated by the FRY security 
forces.
4
 On the other hand there were two main (and over-lapping) arguments which 
                                               
1 Jia, B.B., ‘Independence of Kosovo: A Unique Case of Secession?’ Chinese Journal of International 
Law 8 (2009): 27-46. 
2
 Five states emerged from the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). On 
27 April 1992 two of the six republics of the SFRY – Serbia and Montenegro – formed the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia which was considered by the EC Peace Conference Arbitration Commission to 
be a new state. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission (hereinafter the Badinter 
Commission), Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, (1992) Opinion No. 
9. The FRY was recognised by member states of the European Community following the Dayton 
Agreement of 14 December 1995. The other four republics became independent states: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. 
3 On the question of nomenclature and in particular toponymes, the 1974 Federal Constitution of the 
SFRY referred to ‘Kosovo’. Kosovo, however, is generally known to Serbs as ‘Kosovo-Metohija’. As 
with so many of the internecine conflicts in the Balkans, place names carry great political significance. 
Metohija is a Greek word which indicates part of a district which was Orthodox Church property. E. 
Kofos, “The Two-Headed Albanian Question”, in Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War ed. T. 
Veremis and E. Kofos (ELIAMEP: Athens, 1998), 48. For Kosovo Albanians, the preferred term is 
Kosova, an Albanian name which describes it as an ethnically Albanian land (Kofos at 48). Throughout 
the crisis, the name Kosovo was used by most members of the international community including the 
United Nations Security Council (e.g. in Resolution 1244 (1999) which authorised an international civil 
and military presence in Kosovo) and this name will be used here. 
4 Antonio Cassese, “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?” European Journal of 
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considered the intervention to be unjustifiable on ‘humanitarian’ grounds. These 
suggested either that humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorisation 
is illegal under international law;
5
 or that any legitimacy claimed for the intervention, 
whether moral of legal, was undermined by the fact that the western powers were 
motivated by strategic rather than humanitarian concerns.
6
 
This chapter will argue that the intervention should not be addressed in such a 
temporally and substantively limited way, and that its legality in fact ought to be 
addressed beyond the exclusive confines of the humanitarian intervention narrative, 
an approach that will help us come to terms with the international response to 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. On a temporal level, it 
seems that, given the intensity of the international  involvement in FRY’s affairs from 
March 1998 onwards, any ‘intervention’, whether humanitarian or otherwise, should 
properly be considered to have taken place over this year-long period, and not simply 
when NATO’s bombing began. Although the bombing campaign clearly represented a 
different order of intervention, the period from March 1998 saw an intense process of 
coercive diplomacy which included, from August 1998 onwards, threats that force 
would be used.
7
 Secondly, in substantive terms, it would appear that the agenda of the 
Western powers throughout this period was not exclusively, or even perhaps 
primarily, driven by humanitarian concerns. That is not to say that there was not a 
humanitarian problem – certainly from the summer of 1998 onwards, over 200,000 
Kosovars were displaced from their homes, and between January and March 1999 this 
problem intensified
8
 – but it is equally clear that the diplomatic endeavours of the 
various international organisations went beyond attempts either to bring about an end 
to the military conflict between the FRY and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), or 
to alleviate humanitarian problems. The international community in fact sought to 
broker an overall political settlement, and to this end in both October 1998 and March 
                                                                                                                                      
International Law 10 (1999): 23-30; Abraham Sofaer, “International Law and Kosovo”, Stanford 
Journal of International Law 36 (2000): 4; and The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 
The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 4 (the Independent International Commission on Kosovo is hereinafter referred to as the 
‘IIC’). Even the IIC report which supported the intervention said it was “illegal but legitimate”, The 
Kosovo Report at 4, a position also taken by a UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
Report – HC Foreign Affairs Committee Fourth Report, 23 May 2000, para. 138. For other opinions 
which consider the bombing to have been unlawful but which are otherwise sympathetic to NATO’s 
motivations see, Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” European 
Journal of International Law 10 (1999): 1-22, Michael J. Glennon, “The New Interventionism: The 
Search for a Just International Law” 78 Foreign Affairs 2 (1999). See also, Nico Schrijver, “NATO in 
Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention turns into Von Clausewitz War” International Law Forum 1 
(1999): 155-159. 
5 Jonathan I. Charney, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo,” American Journal of 
International Law 93 (1999): 835-6.  
6 Among those sceptical of the idea that NATO and others were motivated by humanitarian concerns 
include: Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of 
the West (New York: Verso, 2001); Robert M. Hayden, “Humanitarian Hypocrisy,” East European 
Constitutional Review 8 (1999): 91-96; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 
(Oxford: Oxford Unversity Press, 2000), 36. 
7 Going back further, in many ways the ‘long intervention’ has its origins in the dissolution of the 
Yugoslav state in the early 1990s. The Dayton Accord, the continuing presence of the UN in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the ongoing work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
are all examples of sustained ‘intervention’ in the former-Yugoslav lands by the international 
community. Below we will discuss how the fall-out of Yugoslavia’s collapse, in particular the Bosnian 
war, helped shape the approach taken by international actors from 1998-9. It seems that NATO’s 
bombing campaign in Kosovo requires to be set within this broader context. 
8 UNHCR figures cited by IIC Report, note 4 above, 82. 
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1999 (the latter occasion being the Rambouillet forum) the Western powers attempted 
to impose a model of autonomy for Kosovo which was drafted by them, and which, if 
accepted by Belgrade, would have amounted to nothing less than an externally 
imposed re-working of the constitutions of Serbia and the FRY. Finally it is also 
important to reconsider what is meant by the term ‘intervention’ itself. Certainly it 
may involve the use or threat of force, but it should also be broad enough to include 
the use of coercive diplomacy, including but not exhausted by the use of economic 
and financial sanctions. It is important to recognise that intervention can take different 
forms and that diplomacy of this kind when exercised by powerful states or 
international actors can impact upon state the reality of sovereignty. Martin Loughlin 
discusses sovereignty as having both a legal and political dimension. These he 
defines, respectively, as ‘competence’ representing legal ‘authority’, and ‘capacity’ 
representing political ‘power’.9 While coercive diplomacy may not affect a state’s 
legal competence to control its territory, it can certainly impinge upon its political 
capacity; and to ignore this political dimension is to fall into what Neil Walker terms 
sociological naïveté.
10
 For example, powerful states can control trade terms for errant 
states, and organisations like NATO and the European Union can use membership of 
important economic and political bodies as ways of influencing state behaviour.  
In this chapter it is intended to explore how Kosovan autonomy became such an 
important driving-force behind Western intervention, to the extent that this issue, in 
addition to humanitarian problems in Kosovo, was instrumental in the NATO 
decision-making process which resulted in the bombing campaign of March 1999 and 
a factor that helps explain how Kosovo has moved to the verge of statehood today 
with the complicity of the Western powers.
11
 The pressure exerted upon the FRY to 
reach an autonomy settlement with Kosovo begs the question: why should the internal 
constitutional arrangements of the FRY have been a source of such international 
concern? In a sense the intervention in Kosovo, with its strong autonomy dimension, 
recalls Hurst Hannum’s argument set out in 1990 that the, “right of autonomy”, was 
emerging as, “a new principle of international law… in the interstices of 
contemporary definitions of sovereignty, self-determination, and the human rights of 
individuals and groups.”12 This chapter will address the West’s intervention from this 
perspective since, at the very least, both humanitarian and autonomy concerns 
combined in driving the international agenda.
13
 It has even been suggested that 
NATO’s intervention represents a ‘nexus’ between the principle of self-determination 
and the developing law of humanitarian intervention in terms of their ‘nature and 
                                               
9 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 84. 
10 Neil Walker, “Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union” European Law 
Journal 4 (1998): 255-388. 
11 On 18 February 2008 the EU presidency announced that member states were free to decide 
individually whether to recognise Kosovo's independence; most have done so.  
12 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 473. References to ‘autonomy’ in 
this chapter are very case specific and allude to particular models of self-government which were 
advanced specifically for Kosovo; as such the word is used as, “a relative term which describes the 
extent or degree of independence of a particular entity, rather than defining a particular level of 
independence which can be designated as reaching the status of ‘autonomy’”. Hurst Hannum and 
Richard B. Lillich, “The Concept of Autonomy in International Law” American Journal of 
International Law 74 (1980): 858-889. 
13 It perhaps also reflects the fact that in recent years there has developed within Europe, particularly in 
light of the collapse of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, a growing emphasis upon 
autonomy for national minorities as a political and legal priority, a point returned to in the conclusion 
below. 
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content’.14 Whether or not we can go as far as this is not clear, but it does seem that 
the ‘autonomy dimension’ in the West’s approach to Kosovo ought to be treated 
seriously.  
In Part 2, the story of Western involvement from March 1998 to the end of that 
year will be re-traced in order to illustrate just how pervasive was the determination of 
the international community, not only to end the military conflict and ameliorate 
humanitarian suffering, but to secure a political resolution to the perceived problem of 
Kosovo’s constitutional status. In Part 3 it will be suggested that recent Yugoslav 
history, and in particular the lingering international role in the former-Yugoslav lands 
by the late ‘90s, helps explain why, in the case of Kosovo, the international 
community reacted in the way that it did, when similar pressure has not been brought 
to bear on other states throughout the world which deny autonomy to their internal 
minorities. Among the factors which seem to have motivated the Western powers 
were: first, the recent memory of the UN’s failure to stop the internecine wars which 
characterised the SFRY’s dissolution (particularly the war in Bosnia), and the way in 
which the European Community’s approach to state recognition in the wake of that 
dissolution had left Kosovo as perhaps the most prominent loser in this recognition 
process; and secondly, a concern on the part of the international community with the 
way in which Kosovan autonomy, previously entrenched in the SFRY constitution of 
1974, had been emasculated from 1989 onwards by both Serbia and the FRY in a 
process which served to deny Kosovo Albanians both the minority rights and the right 
of internal self-determination which the European Community arbitration process in 





2. The Long Intervention: March 1998-March 1999 
 
It is the contention of this chapter that throughout the twelve month period leading 
to the NATO bombing campaign, the international community was driven as much by 
a politico-constitutional as a humanitarian agenda. Despite this fact, it is easy to see 
how the gradual development from March 1998 onwards of a Western strategy in 
respect of Kosovo has been conceptualised almost exclusively in humanitarian terms. 
This is largely a consequence of the way in which the international community (and 
latterly NATO in particular) presented justifications for intervening in the internal 
affairs of the FRY based upon the need for conflict control and for the alleviation of 
humanitarian problems. This construction of a humanitarian intervention agenda in 
itself resulted from a perception that the only legal basis which could be turned to in 
order to overcome both the prohibition on the use of force and the protection of the 
FRY’s sovereignty and territorial integrity under international law, was a 
humanitarian one. Certainly, there is no doubt that humanitarian concerns were 
genuine ones. For example, in March 1998 the initial trigger for the West’s response 
clearly was the deterioration of the security situation in Kosovo, and, in particular, the 
clamp-down by FRY security forces on the operations of KLA militants – a clamp-
down which resulted in further conflict and an increasingly tense refugee situation. As 
reports emerged in March-April, of a growing cycle of violence between the FRY and 
                                               
14 Dajena Kumbaro, The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, 
Territorial Integrity and the NATO Intervention, Final Report (NATO Office of Information and Press, 
2001), 66. 
15 Below both Kosovo’s status as an ‘autonomous province’ of Serbia and the work of the arbitration 
process will be discussed. 
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the increasingly militant KLA, the international community began to respond. Aside 
from the motivations behind Western involvement, it is also interesting that in the 
early stages of international pressure and throughout the coming months, the 
diplomatic efforts which were put in place would be marked by a high degree of co-
operation and integration amongst a range of international and regional bodies. It is 
submitted that this concerted campaign of collective diplomacy of itself constitutes a 
form of intervention in the FRY’s affairs.  
The lead was taken initially by a Contact Group of the relevant power blocks of the 
USA, Russia and the EU (represented by the UK, France, Germany and Italy);
16
 and 
throughout the year to March 1999, this Group would attempt to build a coherent 
strategy which involved a variety of different organisations, in particular the UN 
Security Council, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
the European Union and NATO.
17
 Although the initial impetus for its establishment 
was the worsening security position, it was clear from the time of the Contact Group’s 
early work that the removal of Kosovan autonomy by Belgrade (a process which, as 
will be discussed below, had taken place since 1989) was also of considerable 
concern; and even at this early stage, as diplomatic pressure began to be exerted, a 
revision of Kosovo’s constitutional status was high on the international agenda. For 
example, the initial Contact Group Statement of 9 March 1998 set out a list of 
proposals by which it hoped to help resolve the violence in Kosovo. This listed 
various practical and immediate steps which are common in diplomatic initiatives of 
this type, such as a call for cessation of hostilities on both sides and an end to all 
forms of external support for such hostilities. What is notable, however, is that at this 
early stage the Contact Group also made clear its intention to secure a political 
settlement and to guarantee greater autonomy for Kosovo.
18
 Although this 
commitment was hedged with the qualification that any such autonomy arrangement 
should not affect the FRY’s territorial integrity, the March statement certainly 
represented more than a simple attempt to bring about a cessation of hostilities; at the 
very least it also served to recognise that the deteriorating military situation resulted 
from Kosovo’s emasculated constitutional status, and that the achievement of any 
long-term solution would require that this issue be addressed. The remainder of this 
section of the chapter will discuss how the issue of autonomy for Kosovo remained 
high on the international agenda through to the autumn of 1998 in terms of both the 
attempts to secure a diplomatic settlement in the spring and summer of 1998, and the 
agreements secured in October 1998 (which in the end were not fully implemented). 
 
 
                                               
16 An initial meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Contact Group states was held in London. Office of 
the High Representative, Statement of the London Contact Group Meeting, 9 March 1998. The Contact 
Group had in fact been established in April 1994 as the Contact Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
See The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999, Cambridge 
International Document Series, Volume II, ed. Heike Kreiger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 115. 
17 An example of this was the effort undertaken by the Contact Group to secure Security Council 
backing for its initiatives. As early as March 1998 the Contact Group requested the Security Council to 
impose an arms embargo on the FRY which was eventually secured through Security Council 
Resolution 1160, UN Doc. S/RES/1160 (31 Mar. 1998). Another example is the way in which the 
Contact Group referred frequently to SC Res. 1160 (31 Mar. 1998) and  SC Res. 1199, UN Doc. 
S/RES/1199 (23 Sept. 1998) in both framing its efforts to resolve the crisis and in claiming legitimacy 
for its role as mediator. 
18
 For example the Statement of 9 March proposed a new diplomatic mission by former Spanish Prime 
Minister Felipe Gonzalez. 
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a. Kosovo: The Self-Determination Dimension 
 
The initial strategy pursued by the Contact Group in the Spring of 1998 was to 
pressurise the FRY into entering negotiations with moderate Kosovars led by Ibrahim 
Rugova of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) who distanced himself from the 
militant strategy of the KLA (political divisions amongst Kosovars themselves would 
remain a problem for international negotiators throughout the crisis and beyond). 
Although the Contact Group was keen that any such negotiations should involve 
international mediation (in particular that of Felipe Gonzalez who was nominated as 
the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office),
19
 this plan met with 
firm resistance from the FRY government,
20
 which remained consistently hostile 
throughout the crisis to external interference in what it considered to be an issue of 
internal security.
21
 Instead, Belgrade responded to the Contact Group’s demand for 
autonomy for Kosovo with a referendum on 23 April 23 1998. This poll was held 
exclusively within Serbia (which included Kosovo within its republican borders). This 
served as a clear statement that Kosovo was not a republic within the FRY but was 
simple a province of Serbia, therefore reinforcing Kosovo’s weak constitutional status 
vis-à-vis the FRY as a whole. In the referendum, the Serbian people were asked for 
their views on international mediation, and they responded with a message of 
overwhelming opposition to the idea, thereby creating a mandate for Belgrade’s 
resistance to Contact Group pressure.
22
 At this early stage, with the Contact Group 
seeking autonomy for Kosovo, and Belgrade responding with a referendum, the 
dispute between FRY and the western powers crystallised to a large extent around the 
issue of self-determination. On the one hand, the Contact Group, in arguing for 
greater internal autonomy for Kosovo, was suggesting implicitly if not explicitly that 
the people of Kosovo had a right to ‘internal’ self-determination, and that this right 
was not being properly accommodated by the state; while, on the other hand, 
Belgrade considered that Kosovars did not constitute a separate ‘people’ and that the 
relevant self-determining units were either the people of the FRY or the people of 
Serbia (both of which entities incorporated Kosovo). Working on the assumption that 
Serbians were the relevant ‘people’ for the purposes of internal self-determination, the 
Yugoslav authorities could point to the April referendum as a clear expression of 
public faith in the Serbian authorities to reject external interference. Furthermore, 
throughout the crisis, the federal government could rely upon another important 
feature of the right to self-determination under international law: namely, the way in 
which references to it in international instruments are so often juxtaposed with 
concomitant commitments to the territorial integrity of the state – a fact which at the 
                                               
19 See UN Doc. S/1998/608 (2 July 1998). 
20 “Milosevic Rejects Mediation, Defies Sanctions,” Reuters, 8 May 1998. 
21 In this early period the FRY’s resistance was maintained despite considerable pressure from the US 
which was the major player in the eyes of both Belgrade and Pristina. For example, in May lengthy 
talks took place between President Milošević and US envoy Richard Holbrooke, “US Sends Peace 
Broker Holbrooke to Yugoslavia,”  Reuters, 9 May 1998; “US Envoy Holbrooke Starts Kosovo 
Mission,” Reuters, 10 May 1998. For a discussion of FRY intransigence on the question of 
international mediation see Kofos, note 3 above, 83. 
22 “Serbs vote on Kosovo amid fears of Violence,” Reuters, 23 April 1998. According to the Serbian 
Referendum Commission almost 95% voted against intervention (although the referendum was 
boycotted by ethnic Albanians) – “Serbs vote ‘No’ to West in Kosovo,” Reuters, 23 April 1998. The 
referendum took place one week before a report by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council, 
and was criticised by the OSCE as being a diversionary tactic and for having, “a disruptive effect on an 
already inflamed situation”. (Statement of the OSCE Troika, 8 April 1998). UN Doc. S/1998/361, 
(1998), Annex II, para. 6.  
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very least precluded any prospect of independence for Kosovo without the FRY’s 
consent (such a commitment to the FRY’s territorial integrity was included in the 
Contact Group’s March statement, and was thereafter repeated frequently by 
international organisations).  
This linkage between the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination 
highlights the legal and practical difficulties which any international body or group of 
states face in attempting to pressurise a state into agreeing to autonomy for an internal 
minority when the state resists such pressure and is able to demonstrate strong popular 
opposition to any external involvement in such a process of constitutional 
accommodation. At a deeper level, it also demonstrates the tension or paradox within 
the principle of self-determination which can, through its commitment to territorial 
integrity, to some extent seemingly belie the commitment to self-government for all 
peoples which it claims to assert.
23
 In this context, the republic-wide referendum held 
by Serbia echoed that earlier referendum held in Bosnia in 1992 referred to above on 
the recommendation of the Badinter Commission.
24
 Just as the principle of self-
determination was used to defend the result of this referendum, and hence Bosnia’s 
territorial integrity, in the face of secessionism by Bosnian Serbs, so too could Serbia 
rely on the referendum of April 1998 as legitimising its opposition to secessionist 
Kosovars.
25
 Throughout the crisis, the UN Security Council was also aware of this 
difficulty, and in its subsequent endorsements of greater autonomy for Kosovo it too 
confirmed the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
26
 It is no surprise, therefore, that the 
hard and fast linkage between the principle of self-determination and that of territorial 
integrity comes under criticism. For example, Hurst Hannum is one commentator 
who, in the Kosovo context, has recently suggested that in an international quest for 
greater autonomy for an oppressed group, the oppressor state’s right to territorial 
integrity should not be treated as an absolute consideration: “Why should we assume 
                                               
23 Martti Koskenniemi addresses the issue from another perspective – that of law’s credibility. If self-
determination is open to reinterpretation so as to accord a right to statehood in response to new 
generations of group rights claims this may expose international law’s inherent vulnerability since it 
could lead to the meaning of self-determination as a legal principle being too readily open to processes 
of re-configuration which in the end could undermine the very concept of statehood itself.  Martti 
Koskenniemi, “Theory, Implications for the Practitioner” in Theory and International Law: an 
Introduction, eds. P. Allott et. al. (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
1991), 7.  
24 Arbitration Commission, 31 ILM, 1488, Opinion No. 4 para. 4. 
25 Admittedly the situation was, from another perspective, in fact, very different given that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina prior to its recognition had promised autonomy for Bosnian Serbs which the FRY and 
Serbia were denying to Kosovo. Nonetheless the Bosnian experience does call into question the 
decision of the states of the European Community to recognise only former Yugoslav ‘republics’ as 
states through the application of the principle of uti possidetis juris to republican borders (this will be 
discussed further below). See also J. Laponce, “National Self-Determination and Referendums: the 
Case for Territorial Revisionism,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7 (2001): 33-56. The use of 
referendums  both in Serbia and in Bosnia highlight how these devices can exacerbate problematic 
situations by polarising rather than reconciling divergent positions within a territory. Margaret Moore, 
“Normative Justifications for Liberal Nationalism: Justice, Democracy and National Identity,” Nations 
and Nationalism 7 (2001): 1-20. Michael Lusztig and Colin Knox, “Good things and small packages: 
lessons from Canada for the Northern Irish Constitutional Settlement,” Nations and Nationalism 5 
(1999): 543-563. 
26 It supported the Contact Group’s attempts to secure a peaceful resolution of the conflict which would 
include an enhanced status for Kosovo, involving a substantially greater degree of autonomy and 
meaningful self-administration. SC Res. 1160, UN Doc. S/RES/1160 (31 Mar. 1998), para. 5; SC Res. 
1199, UN Doc. S/RES/1199 (23 Sep. 1998), (preamble); and SC Res. 1203, UN Doc. S/RES/1203 (24 
Oct. 1998), preamble. 
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that the frontiers that existed at the dawn of a new millennium should be maintained 
forever. Aren’t other values – preserving cultural identity, increasing meaningful and 
effective participation – equally important?”27 In many ways the Kosovo crisis even 
going back to the 1990s already raised questions for the discipline of international law 
in highlighting so starkly the paradoxes and inconsistencies which attend the right of 
self-determination, questions that would only come to a head as the final status of the 




b.Towards a Political Solution 
 
As has been mentioned, the year from March 1998 to March 1999 was notable for 
the degree of international co-operation and the development of an integrated strategy 
with which the international community sought to approach the Kosovo problem. This 
is evident in the use of sanctions which began with the Contact Group calling for an 
arms embargo in March 1998, and which also led to the imposition of economic 
sanctions as the Contact Group attempted to encourage an agreement on Kosovo’s 
status. This approach was set out by the Contact Group at its meeting of 9 March as 
follows: “Unless the FRY takes steps to resolve the serious political and human rights 
issues in Kosovo, there is no prospect of any improvement in its international 
standing. On the other hand, concrete progress to resolve the serious political and 
human rights issues in Kosovo will improve the international position of the FRY and 
prospects for normalisation of its international relationships and full rehabilitation in 
international institutions.”29 In this regard President Milošević was given an 
ultimatum, “to take rapid and effective steps to stop the violence and engage in a 
commitment to find a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue.”30 
Since the Dayton Agreement concluded on 14 December 1995, and largely in 
consequence of the unsatisfactory situation in Kosovo, an ‘outer wall’ of United 
States-led sanctions against the FRY had remained in place which prevented the 
FRY’s admission to the World Bank and the IMF; and now pressure mounted to 
extend these restrictions. Initially in April 1998, as tension grew, the Contact Group 
imposed a freeze on FRY assets held abroad.
31
 Tying these sanctions to its wider 
agenda, the Group confirmed that, on the one hand, the freeze would be lifted 
immediately if Belgrade took the necessary steps, as outlined by the Group, to engage 
in political dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leadership; but that, on the other hand, 
a failure to engage in dialogue would result in further sanctions aimed at halting new 
investment in the FRY.
32
 In other words, sanctions were being used to pressurise 
Belgrade into an autonomy agreement. Throughout the spring of 1998 it was 
                                               
27 Hurst Hannum, Territorial Autonomy: Permanent Solution or Step Toward Secession? (ZEF Bonn: 
Centre for Development Research, 2000), 4. 
28 P. Hilpold, “The Kosovo Case and International Law: Looking for Applicable Theories,” Chinese 
Journal of International Law 8 (2009): 47-62.  
29 Contact Group Statement, 9 March  1998, para. 8. 
30 Treating Milošević as personally responsible for the situation, the Contact Group made clear that he 
should within 10 days: “…commit himself publicly to begin a process of dialogue... with the leadership 
of the Kosovar Albanian community and co-operate in a constructive manner with the Contact Group 
in the implementation of the actions specified [in the Statement]... which require action by the FRY 
government.” Contact Group Statement 9 March  1998, para. 7.  
31 This was imposed immediately on 29 April 1998. “Big Powers back New Sanctions on Yugoslavia,” 
Reuters, 29 April 1998. 
32 Ibid. It should be noted that there was a general lack of enthusiasm for these measures from Russia, 
which indicated an underlying tension within the Contact Group which would eventually split the 
Group with the commencement of NATO’s air-strikes in March 1999. 
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repeatedly evident that sanctions were being employed as both threat and inducement 
in an attempt to broker a political deal. For example, since negotiations had not begun 
by 9 May 1998, on that date the Contact Group indicated that it would impose the 
investment ban on the FRY;
33
 however, two weeks later, on 23 May, with talks 
having begun between Milošević and Rugova on 15 May, the Group eased sanctions 
and decided not to put this ban into effect.
34
 
The Contact Group’s strategy on the use of sanctions was endorsed by other actors. 
For example, the UN Security Council followed the Contact Group lead, not only by 
imposing an arms embargo, but also by endorsing its attempt to produce a political 
settlement.
35
 Hence both Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199 had three main 
aims: the two short-term goals of conflict control and alleviation of the growing 
humanitarian crisis; and thirdly, the more ambitious objective of securing a political 
resolution to the dispute. In this context, the Security Council called upon the 
authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community, 
“urgently to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status 
issues”.36 Furthermore, it set out its intention to review the situation on the basis of 
reports by the Secretary-General who would assess whether the Government of the 
FRY was co-operating with the UN’s demand that it begin a substantive dialogue,37 
which should include the participation of an outside representative or representatives 
(notably of course also a Contact Group demand).
38
 The Security Council’s call for 
talks on autonomy again raises the issue of self-determination in relation to Kosovo. 
In a report written for NATO, Dajena Kumbaro argued that the call in SC Res. 1160 
for a meaningful dialogue on political status issues, and its, “support for an enhanced 
status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy 
and meaningful self-administration”,39 is recognition of Kosovo’s status as a ‘people’ 
with a right of ‘internal’ self-determination.40 Certainly Security Council resolutions 
                                               
33 “West Imposes Sanctions on Yugoslavia,” Reuters, 9 May 1998. Once again Russia dissented from 
the decision. 
34 The Group undertook to consider later in May whether to continue with the freeze on the FRY funds 
held abroad as well as with the other sanctions still in place – “Serbian Sanctions put on Hold,” 
Reuters, 19 May 1998. The Contact Group was now faced with a situation in which it had relaxed 
sanctions against the FRY only to see the Kosovo Albanians suspend the talks scheduled for June 5 in 
the face of the advancement by Serbian/FRY forces on civilian population centres, a scenario which 
prompted Albania’s Foreign Minister Pascal Milo to comment: “Unfortunately the Contact Group of 
countries has given Milosevic much more carrot than stick.” “Big Powers plan Kosovo Meeting Next 
Week,” Reuters, 4 June 1998. It was widely suspected that Belgrade was in fact using the talks as a 
smoke-screen to continue its military campaign in Kosovo whilst at the same time benefiting from an 
easing of sanctions. 
35 It would also in due course endorse the October Agreements which were eventually brokered by the 
Group in the autumn of 1998 (see below). 
36 SC Res. 1160, UN Doc. S/RES/1160 (31 Mar. 1998), para. 4. 
37 Ibid. para 16 (a). 
38 Ibid. para. 16. Reiterating that the FRY could either improve or weaken its international standing by 
the action it took, the Resolution affirmed that: “concrete progress to resolve the serious political and 
human rights issues in Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and prospects for normalisation of its international relationships and full participation in 
international institutions”, (para 18), but also affirmed that, “failure to make constructive progress 
towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional 
measures” (para 19). 
39 SC Res 1160, UN Doc. S/RES/1160, para 5. 
40 Kumbaro, note 14 above, 40. 
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throughout the period to March 1999 combined concerns with the worsening security 
situation with calls for Kosovar autonomy.
41
 
Both the EU and OSCE were also involved in attempting to stimulate dialogue 
between the parties in terms of paragraph 16(a) of Res. 1160. Belgrade continued to 
insist that negotiations should be conducted by the Republic of Serbia and not by the 
FRY, which was another way of reinforcing the point that Kosovo was 
constitutionally part of Serbia. Kosovo Albanians objected to this arrangement since 
they wanted to negotiate directly with the federal FRY government. Another problem 
remained in Belgrade’s opposition to the involvement of an independent third party in 
negotiations; instead, Serbia offered ‘mediation’ by a representative of the FRY 
government and insisted that a solution must be found within the constitution of the 
Republic of Serbia. On 27 March 1998, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE 
Bronislav Geremek visited the FRY where he met authorities in Belgrade, Pristina, 
and Podgorica (the capital of Montenegro). During his talks with President Milošević 
in Belgrade, Milošević confirmed that the FRY would not be ready to accept OSCE 
demands concerning international mediation before taking back its seat in the 
Organisation. He indicated that he would be willing to negotiate with Mr. Gonzalez, 
on the condition that Gonzalez’s mandate would be limited to the question of re-
admittance of the FRY to the OSCE. As far as the EU was concerned this amounted 
to the establishment of a precondition,
42
 which the Security Council had declared to 
be unacceptable in paragraph 4 of Resolution 1160 (1998). In this early period, 
therefore, Western ire within both the EU and OSCE was raised as much by the 




As the security situation deteriorated in the summer of 1998,
44
 and in light of the 
continuing failure on the part of the FRY to initiate talks, the Contact Group began to 
draw up a new peace plan which was to involve a much more detailed level of 
international  pressure, including an elaborate plan for a constitutional solution to the 
perceived problem of Kosovo’s status. For example, a Contact Group statement of 12 
June 1998 set out further demands,
45
 and by 9 July  the group had prepared an outline 
                                               
41 SC Res. 1199, UN Doc. S/RES/1199 (23 Sep. 1998) and SC Res. 1203, UN Doc. S/RES/1203 (24 
Oct. 1998). 
42 UN Doc. S/1998/361 (1998), Annex 1, paras. 2-4. The OSCE took the same view, (Annex II para. 4). 
43
 It would, however, be artificial to attempt to separate these two issues too rigidly; one of the reasons 
a political settlement was sought was that it would help solve the humanitarian problems. Nonetheless 
the degree of international immersion in the details of such a solution indicated Western preoccupation 
with the constitutional issue. 
44 A large number of FRY troops were moved into Kosovo on 13 June. UN Doc. S/1998/470 (1998), 
paras. 19-20. Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1998 the Security Council continued to receive the 
Secretary-General’s reports pursuant to Res. 1160, S/RES/1160 (31 Mar. 1998), which described 
mounting tension on the ground and continued fighting, echoing the findings of the EU and OSCE, e.g. 
UN Doc. S/1998/470 (1998), paras. 13-15. This report also noted  human rights abuses by both sides 
(paras. 16-18), and an increase in the number of internally displaced persons leading to a significant 
flow of refugees to Albania from May onwards. Furthermore, the Secretary General identified the 
failed talks of May 1998 and the continued refusal of Belgrade to accept the participation of Felipe 
Gonzalez as problematic, and he expressed his grave concern that in light of this failure, mounting 
violence in Kosovo might overwhelm political efforts to prevent further escalation of the crisis. UN 
Doc. S/1998/470 (4 June 1998). See also: UN Doc. S/1998/608 (1998), para. 10; and Information on 
the Situation in Kosovo and on Measures taken by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, submitted pursuant to paragraphs 13 and 16 of SC Resolution 1160 (1998), UN Doc. 
S/1998/712 (1998), paras. 11-14. 
45 A British Foreign Office spokesman announced the demand by Contact Group ministers of an 
immediate cessation of all action by the security forces against civilians, unimpeded access for 
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peace agreement based on a plan of autonomy for Kosovo. This plan would have 
entailed substantial self-government for Kosovo but continued to rule out 
independence as an option.
46
 Throughout the summer this plan was the basis of 
increasingly urgent and proactive international demands for a detailed constitutional 
solution; but, once again, as had occurred in May, moves towards political dialogue 
were soon undone by events on the ground, and by the end of July fighting had 
intensified as a result of a massive Serbian/FRY offensive against the KLA, which led 
ultimately to the collapse of this initiative.
47
  
This offensive reminded the Security Council of the need to force the political 
pace, and, in yet another display of the international co-operation which prevailed at 
this time, the Security Council endorsed the Contact Group’s June initiative by way of 
Res. 1199 (1998).
48
 One particular catalyst for this further Security Council resolution 
was the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 4 September, which 
contained a dramatic depiction of the declining humanitarian and security situation 
resulting from the ongoing summer offensive against the KLA. The prospect of new 
talks had further diminished from the already unpromising position which had 
prevailed in the spring of 1998,
49
 and, therefore, in a more urgent tone, Security 
Council Resolution 1199 called upon the authorities in the FRY and the Kosovo 
Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue.
50
 This 
resolution echoed several of the Contact Group’s demands originally contained in the 
Group’s statement of 12 June 1998, for example: that these talks should take place 
without preconditions and with international involvement; that they should involve 
                                                                                                                                      
international monitors and humanitarian organisations to Kosovo, the right of refugees to return to their 
homes and rapid progress towards a dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leadership. Contact Group 
Statement, 12 June 1998.  “Russia Opposes NATO Force against Serbia,” Reuters, 12 June 1998. 
46 “Serbian Parties Hail Kosovo Plan, US Warns of War,” Reuters, 9 July 1999. 
47 This led to a growing pessimism among the Contact Group powers. “Despair in West as Prospects 
for Peace Diminish,” Reuters, 28 July 1998; Kosovo Faces All-out War as Serb Tanks Shell Rebels,” 
Daily Telegraph (London), 27 July 1998. On 23 July the OSCE reported that it had failed to persuade 
the FRY government to allow a permanent OSCE diplomatic mission to return to Kosovo or to accept 
the mediation of Felipe Gonzalez without a restoration of Yugoslavia’s full membership of the OSCE.  
“Milosevic Refuses Permanent OSCE Mission,” Reuters, 23 July 1998. By 5 August Reuters reported 
that the West was growing increasingly frustrated and that again NATO was drawing up contingency 
plans. “West warns Milosevic on Kosovo,” Reuters, 6 August 1998. On 6 August the Albanian 
parliament appealed to the international community to intervene militarily in Kosovo, “Albania urges 
Western Military Action in Kosovo,” Reuters, 6 August 1998. 
48 SC Res. 1199, UN Doc. S/RES/1199 (23 Sep. 1998), para. 4. 
49 The Secretary-General’s report in August followed the collapse of the Contact Group’s July initiative 
to broker a settlement, and included a report from the OSCE which highlighted that the Republic of 
Serbia continued to maintain the precondition that dialogue should be conducted within the framework 
of both Serbia and the FRY and that the territorial integrity of the FRY should first be guaranteed. UN 
Doc. S/1998/712, (1998), Annex I, para. 12. The Secretary General’s reports were very influential: for 
example, UN Doc. S/1998/470, (4, June 1998); UN Doc. S/1998/608 (1998); UN Doc. S/1998/712 
(1998); UN Doc. S/1998/834 (4 September 1998). His reports continued up until the air-strikes of 
March 1999: UN Doc. S/1998/912 (3 October 199); UN Doc. S/1998/1068 (12 November 1998); UN 
Doc. S/1998/1221 (24 December 1998); UN Doc. S/1999/99 (30 January 1999); UN Doc. S/1999/293, 
(17 March 1999). 
50 This resolution adopted much stronger language than Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) in 
demanding that all parties cease hostilities. SC Res. 1199, UN Doc. S/RES/1199 (23 Sep. 1998),  para. 
1. As such it affirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and 
security in the region. SC Res. 1199, Preamble. 
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rapid progress to a clear timetable; and that they should lead to an end to the crisis and 
to a, “negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo.51 
 
The worsening situation towards late summer
52
 eventually led to the hardening of 
the West’s attitude when it came to commitments undertaken by the FRY in October 
which were secured against the back-drop of a NATO ultimatum on the use of force. 
This followed the issue on 24 September of an Activation Warning by the North 
Atlantic Council, which made the prospect of military operations ever more real. The 
NATO ultimatum was taken seriously by Belgrade and led to a cease-fire and then to 
a political settlement brokered by Richard Holbrooke.
53
 The October process had two 
main elements: first, was a two-part verification agreement whereby the FRY 
undertook to reduce its forces in Kosovo to pre-conflict levels, and assented to 
mechanisms by which this process could be verified;
54
 and secondly, (and very 
significantly given the Contact Group’s agenda over the previous eight months), was 
the main agreement which envisaged a political settlement to the crisis, signed on 
October 12.
55
 This latter agreement emerged from the paper prepared by the Contact 
Group which proposed autonomy for Kosovo within the FRY. It was then promoted 
by the US Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill in a process of shuttle 
diplomacy over the summer of 1998. The substance of the agreement was a guarantee 
of autonomy for Kosovo for an interim three year period at the end of which the 
agreement would be re-assessed.
56
 The Contact Group was keen to entrench this 
settlement quickly and, therefore, the agreement included a public commitment by the 
FRY to complete negotiations on a framework for a political settlement by 2 
November ; by 9 November the detailed rules and procedure for an election were to 
be agreed, and the election itself was to be held within nine months under OSCE 
supervision. Finally, the integrated  nature of the international  approach was further 




3. The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and Western Intervention 
 
Having reviewed the intensity of Western efforts to secure an autonomy agreement 
for Kosovo from spring to autumn 1998, it is interesting to reflect upon why the 
international community reacted with such dedication and forcefulness in seeking to 
reach such an autonomy settlement, bearing in mind that the rights of disgruntled 
minorities elsewhere have not attracted such attention. The recent history of 
Yugoslavia seems to have been instrumental to the interest which Kosovo generated, 
since the international community was very conscious both of UN inertia in failing to 
                                               
51 SC Res. 1199, para. 3. The Security Council’s language was, by 24 October 1998, to become even 
more imperative in Resolution 1203 (1998) which stressed the ‘urgent’ need for such dialogue. SC Res. 
1203, S/RES/1203 (24 Oct. 1998), para. 5. 
52 Notably, however, although there were a large number of displaced persons, in terms of the fighting 
itself Tim Judah comments: “[t]here were few casualties on either side.” Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and 
Revenge (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 171. 
53 By this agreement the FRY agreed to comply with the demands of the Security Council. 
54 These two agreements were signed on 15 and 16 October.  
55 All three agreements were endorsed by Serbia. 
56 An interim three year settlement was of course central to the Rambouillet Agreement eventually 
signed by the Kosovo Albanians on 18 March 1999. See Marc Weller, “The Rambouillet conference on 
Kosovo” International Affairs 75 (1999): 219-220, 226 and 244-245  
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prevent the wars which marked Yugoslavia’s collapse (in particular the war in 
Bosnia), and of the EC’s approach to state recognition from which Kosovo was 
excluded. The removal by both Serbia and FRY of much of the autonomy which 
Kosovo had enjoyed under the SFRY constitution of 1974, served only to cast 
Kosovo’s misfortune in an even starker light. 
 
a. The Spectre of Bosnia 
 
For the Contact Group, the emerging crisis in 1998 was an unwelcome reminder of 
the aftermath of Yugoslavia’s collapse from 1991-2 and the mistakes of hesitancy and 
confusion which characterised, in particular, the international reaction to the ensuing 
war in Bosnia.
57
 There is certainly a sense in which the Western powers, in their 
approach to the political situation in Kosovo from March 1998, were partly driven by 
a sense of guilt stemming from the UN’s failure to do more to prevent the Bosnian 
conflict. For example, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook announced early in the 
crisis that there should be “no more Bosnias”;58 while, as the situation deteriorated in 
April 1998, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated dramatically that, “we 
are on the road back to hell”.59 On one level, the memory of Bosnia as a killing field 
is a fairly obvious motivating factor in the international approach to Kosovo given 
that it represented a recent event in the same region, and one clearly marked by 
international inaction. It seems, however, that the fall-out from Bosnia was significant 
in another sense: namely in the legal context of Yugoslavia’s collapse and the 
international approach to the emergence of new states; a process in which Kosovo felt 
itself to be the real loser. 
It is worth recalling the lead taken by the EC as Yugoslavia collapsed, and to 
revisit briefly the legal issues involved – in particular, those surrounding the 
recognition of new states.
60
 The Arbitration Commission established by the EC to 
adjudicate on the legal implications of the Yugoslavia crisis of the early 1990s, with 
Robert Badinter the President of the French Conseil Constitutionnel as chairman, 
                                               
57 Articles which have chronicled the international response to the collapse of the FRY include: 
Christine Gray, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-State Conflict? Characterisation and 
Consequences,” British Yearbook of International Law 68 (1997): 155-197; Dominic McGoldrick, 
“Yugoslavia – The Response of the International Community and of International Law,” 49 Current 
Legal Problems 375-394 (1996); S. Stojanovic, “The Destruction of Yugoslavia,” Fordham Journal of 
International Law 19 (1995-6): 337-362; Stephen Tierney, “In a State of Flux: Self-Determination and 
the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 6 (1999): 197-233; 
Marc Weller, “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia,” American Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 569-607.  
58 He stated: “We are showing a degree of urgency in Kosovo which was unfortunately not present 
when the Bosnian crisis broke out in 1991”. The Guardian (London), 4 March  1998. 
59 US News On-line World Report 13 April 1998. See also Judah, note 52 above, 150. Stephen Tierney, 
“The Road Back to Hell: the international response to the crisis in Kosovo,” in Accommodating 
National Identity: New Approaches in International and Domestic Law ed. Stephen Tierney (Leiden: 
Kluwer Law Publishers, 2000), 89-130. 
60 In many ways the dissolution of Yugoslavia began with events in Kosovo in the late 1980’s. See 
Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1998), i. Commentaries on the 
legal implications of the SFRY’s dissolution include: Colin Warbrick, “Recognition of States,” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41 (1992): 473-82; Colin Warbrick, “Recognition of 
States Part 2,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42 (1993): 433-42; Weller, note 57 
above; Matthew Craven, “The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia,” British 
Yearbook of International Law 66 (1995): 333-413; Roland Rich, “Recognition of States: The Collapse 
of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,” European Journal of International Law 4 (1993): 36-65; 
Dominic McGoldrick, note 57 above. 
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declared in its first opinion that the SFRY was dissolving, thereby circumventing the 
difficult issue of secession.
61
 In light of the SFRY’s collapse, the Arbitration 
Commission turned its attention to the recognition of new states in a process which 
would see Croatia,
 
Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia eventually emerge 
as independent entities.
62
 What is interesting is that the EC, in the Guidelines it 
proposed for recognition of new states, decided to include additional requirements 
which went beyond the minimal standard for recognition of new states laid down in 
the Montevideo Convention of 1933. Article 1 of this Convention contains what is 
essentially a value-neutral test of an aspiring new state’s viability; in short, this 
establishes a duty on states not to recognise a new state unless it satisfies 
fundamental, but largely pragmatic, requirements of statehood. In particular, the new 
state must be able to demonstrate that it exercises governmental control of a clearly 
defined piece of territory with a clearly defined population; and hence that it has the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
63
 The EC super-imposed upon the 
classical Montevideo Convention test several additional criteria. For example, it 
required the republics of Yugoslavia which were applying for recognition by EC 
member states to demonstrate that they had a democratic mandate for independent 
statehood, and that they had put in place constitutional guarantees for human rights, 
particularly minority rights. Leaving to one side the question of whether recognition 
can be constitutive of statehood or is in fact merely declaratory,
64
 as a matter of 
political reality, recognition by the EC had important consequences for the four 
republics mentioned, and certainly hastened the process of UN membership for at 
least three of them. In a sense it is also possible to view the approach taken by the EC 
to the recognition criteria and its application as a form of intervention, since super-
imposing criteria such as democratic and human rights considerations upon the 
standard recognition principles was a subtle way of directing the constitutional futures 
of the newly emerging states.
65
 Another example of the way in which recognition was 
applied politically came in respect of Macedonia where Greek concerns about the new 
state prevented its full recognition for several years.  
The Arbitration Commission’s work remained fresh in the minds of Kosovar 
nationalists who considered it to be unfair. Although the EC had marked new 
departures in recognition policy by declaring the protection of minority rights by new 
states to be essential, it had also drawn a line in terms of the type of entity which 
could seek statehood. Independence was only available to republics of the FRY (as 
defined by the SFRY constitution of 1974) who met the recognition criteria. Applying 
the principle of uti possidetis juris which preserves existing boundaries, the EC 
determined that for the purposes of its recognition policy, Yugoslavia’s internal 
                                               
61 Arbitration Commission, Opinion No.1, International Legal Materials 31 (1992): 1497. See also, 
European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia, International Legal Materials 31 (1992): 1485-86, 
and Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union,” International Legal Materials 31 (1992): 1486-87.   
62 The final status of the other two SFRY republics (Serbia and Montenegro) was not settled as far as 
the EC was concerned until the Dayton Agreement in 1995. 
63 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 League of Nations Treaty Series 
165, 19. 
64 In other words the debate as to whether recognition by other states can actually create a state or 
whether the question of a state’s existence is simply one of fact with recognition serving only to 
evidence that fact. 
65 Zoran Oklopcic, “Populus Interruptus: Self-Determination, the Independence of Kosovo, and the 
Vocabulary of Peoplehood,” Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009): 677 
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republican borders would be decisive.
66
 Kosovo, as an Autonomous Province of the 
Republic of Serbia was not entitled to apply for statehood. On 15 June 1992 the EC 
stated: “frontiers can only be changed by peaceful means and [the EC states] remind 
the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate quest for autonomy should be dealt 
with in the framework of the EC Peace Conference.”67 As a consequence, Kosovo had 
a right only of internal self-determination and its formal application for recognition, 
delivered in a letter by Dr. Rugova, to the chairman of the peace conference convened 
by the EC at the Hague, was not considered.
68
  
Kosovo’s grievances were increased by the inconsistency of the Western approach 
to Yugoslavia’s collapse. The Hague conference which met in September 1991, at the 
very start of the crisis, had initially sought ways to preserve the state of Yugoslavia 
intact, before in the end being forced to recognise that this was not possible.
69
 The 
way in which the West had changed its approach in 1991 continued to fuel Kosovan 
nationalist ambitions for recognition even though the West consistently ruled out this 
possibility; as the Kosovars reasoned, if the Western powers had changed their minds 
once they could do so again.
70
 This notion that Kosovo’s status remained to be 
finalised was further encouraged in Kosovan minds by the Dayton Agreement, where 
once again Western intervention in the former-Yugoslav lands continued. The 
creation of two Bosnian entities was widely seen as a stop-gap measure which would 
only prevent temporarily the incorporation of Serb and Croat regions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina within Serbia and Croatia respectively. Again, therefore, the fall-out 
from Yugoslavia’s collapse seemed to be unfinished, and Kosovars continued to hold 
out hope for independence in part through the further intervention of the western 
powers.
71
 Furthermore, the substance of the Dayton Agreement was in itself also a 
source of grievance to Kosovar nationalists who felt that in reality it violated the uti 
possidetis principle set out in the EC’s recognition policy, particularly if the Bosnian 
Serb entity would one day be permitted to join with the FRY. Whether or not this was 
a realistic complaint, the wide autonomy accredited to the Republika Srpska 
suggested that Bosnian Serb aggression had gained for them advantages which 
Kosovo, despite its discrete constitutional identity under the old SFRY constitution, 
had not received. As Tim Judah puts it: “While they [Kosovo] had had an entity, 
which had played its part as a federal unit in the old Yugoslavia, they were now 
without rights while, in their view, the campaign of genocide led by Bosnian Serb 
leaders was being rewarded.”72 The final insult was that the issue of Kosovo’s status 
was excluded from the Dayton process; instead, the EC states recognised the FRY as 
a state despite the process of constitutional centralisation carried out by Belgrade 
since the late 1980s, and despite the fact that Kosovo languished within both the FRY 
                                               
66 Arbitration Commission, Opinion No.3, International Legal Materials 31 (1992): 1500.  
67 EC Press Statement, Luxembourg, 15 June 1992. 
68 Letter to Lord Carrington, dated 22 December 1991 (for the text of this letter see Krieger, note 16 
above, 118). 
69 See Judah, note 52 above, 156. The decision of the Badinter Commission that the SFRY was in a 
state of dissolution (Arbitration Commission, Opinion No.1) has been called into question by the IIC. 
IIC Report, note 4 above, 58. 
70 The Hague Peace Conference gave some support for Kosovan autonomy in terms of a paper which 
stated that: “the republics shall apply fully and in good faith the provisions existing prior to 1990 for 
autonomous provinces…” Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, Carrington Draft paper, “Treaty 
Provisions for the Convention”, UN Doc. S/23169 (18 October 1991), Annex VII, para. 6.  
71 V. Surroi, “Kosova and the Constitutional Solutions,” in Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War ed. 
T. Veremis and E. Kofos (ELIAMEP: Athens, 1998), 162 and 168. 
72 Judah, note 52 above, 125 
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and Serbia stripped of constitutional autonomy (see below) – a situation which 
seemed to contradict the EC’s commitment, enshrined in the 1992 Guidelines on 
recognition, to ensuring that minority rights are guaranteed before recognition is 
accorded to new states. It is perhaps not surprising that the IIC Report judged that 
Dayton, by giving, “the FRY a free hand in Kosovo”, demoralised and weakened the 
non-violent movement in Kosovo, and, “led directly to a decisive surge of support 
among Kosovars for the path of violent resistance as the only realistic path to 
independence.”73 It seems, therefore, that the long intervention by the Western powers 
since the initial period of the SFRY’s dissolution had heightened expectations within 
Kosovo that international powers would take a hand in securing constitutional 
protections for Kosovo; it was in this context that Dayton proved to be such a 
disappointment for Kosovars, serving to raise the stakes in their quest for autonomy. 
 
b. The Constitutional Status of Kosovo: Serbian Centralisation and the 
Development of Kosovo Albanian Separatism 
 
The failure of Kosovo to secure statehood through the Badinter process was 
compounded by the deteriorating condition of Kosovo’s constitutional status, and in 
particular, by the way in which the autonomy it enjoyed under the 1974 SFRY 
Constitution was dismantled. Under the 1974 constitution Kosovo held the status of 
an Autonomous Province within Serbia and enjoyed political control over many areas 
of internal administration. However, crucially as it would turn out, Kosovars did not 
constitute a ‘nation’ in terms of the Constitution, which described the state as ‘having 
the form of a state community of voluntarily united nations and their Socialist 
Republics, and of the Socialist Autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo’.74  
When it came to the Badinter process, the reference to ‘nations’ in the Constitution 
would be crucial due to the connection between ‘nations’ and ‘their Socialist 
Republics’. ‘Nations’ in the SFRY were peoples having ‘their own’ republics, and a 
republic was defined by the ‘nation’ which formed the majority of its population 
(Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians and Montenegrins). They were distinguished 
under the Constitution from ‘nationalities’; namely minority groups within the SFRY, 
whose ethnic group formed the majority population of neighbouring states such as 
Hungary and Albania. This distinction was important constitutionally, since, with the 
status of ‘nation’ came the constitutional right of self-determination;75 and, as has 
been observed, so too would come recognition by the EC as the FRY dissolved.
76
  
The absence of republican status for Kosovo was, however, compensated for by 
two factors in the 1974 constitution. First, as members of a ‘nationality’, Albanians in 
Kosovo and elsewhere in the SFRY were protected by extensive rights guarantees 
which also applied equally to Yugoslavia’s ‘nations’. Nationalities, for example, 
enjoyed comprehensive language rights; discrimination on grounds of nationality, 
race, and language was outlawed; and incitement to racial hatred and intolerance were 
proscribed as unconstitutional. Secondly, Kosovo, as an Autonomous Province of 
Serbia, enjoyed substantial executive, legislative and judicial autonomy; it possessed 
                                               
73 IIC Report, note 4 above, 59. 
74 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974, Art. 1. 
75 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974, Basic Principles. 
76 The distinction between nations and nationalities can also be found in the Spanish constitution of 
1978, Art.2: “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common 
and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of 
the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” 
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its own constitution, and had legislative jurisdiction which extended to defence and 
even foreign affairs. Although not a full republic, Kosovo also held a seat in the 




From the late 1980s onwards, a series of political and constitutional developments 
took place within both the FRY and the Republic of Serbia by which much of the 
autonomy Kosovo had enjoyed under the 1974 constitution was dismantled. Serbian 
nationalism re-emerged as a force following the death of Tito in 1980, and central to 
the Serbian idea of nationhood was Kosovo. It was the scene of the famous Turkish 
defeat of the Serbian Army at the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, which was exploited 
by Milošević to emphasise the importance of Kosovo to Serbia; in a speech to a rally 
in Belgrade on 19 November 1988, he declared: “Every nation has a love which 
eternally warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo will remain in 
Serbia.”78 Between 1989 and 1992, both Serbia and the SFRY embarked upon a 
process of constitutional centralisation which terminated Kosovan autonomy, a 
process which in turn led to the emergence of the strong separatist movement within 
Kosovo.
79
 This process began in 1989 with constitutional changes, approved by the 
Parliament of Serbia on 28 September, and eventually entrenched in the Constitution 
of the Republic of Serbia adopted in 1990. These changes required the approval of 
Kosovo’s legislative assembly, and by the placing of pro-Milošević personnel in the 
assembly and by the threat of force, this approval was achieved.
80
 The process 
extensively centralised many important areas of power, thereby reducing substantially 
the powers of Kosovo as an Autonomous Province.
81
 As the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights noted: “Under its [i.e. the 1990 Constitution’s] 
provisions the ‘autonomous provinces’ retained some authority over the provincial 
budget, cultural matters, education, health care, use of languages and other matters, 
but the authority was thenceforth to be exercised only in accordance with decisions 
made by the Republic. In fact, the new Constitution gave the Republic the right 
directly to execute its decisions if the provinces failed to do so.”82 Tim Judah also 
observed: “Although legally the province still existed, the changes meant they were 
no longer autonomous.”83 In fact the formal constitutional status of Kosovo as an 
autonomous province (although one stripped of any substantive autonomy) was useful 
to Milosevic at this time, since with Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina under his 
influence, he controlled four of the eight seats on the federal presidency.
84
 In addition, 
a new federal constitution was promulgated in 1992 which also served to consolidate 
Kosovo’s emasculation within the FRY as a whole.85 Crucially, both constitutions 
                                               
77  See Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Special Report on 
Minorities, Periodic Report submitted by Elisabeth Rehn, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, Pursuant to Paragraph 45 of Commission Resolution 1996/71, Report of the 
Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/8, (25 October  1996), Chapters I and II; and 
Krieger, note 16 above, 2-12. 
78 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin, 1996), 63. 
79 Surroi, note 71 above.  
80 Judah, note 52 above, 55-6. 
81 Kofos, note 3 above, 55.   
82 Rehn, note 77 above, Chapter II(c). 
83 Ibid. 56.  
84 Ibid. 
85 For the relevant amendments to both the Serbian and FRY constitutions see Krieger, note 16 above, 
8-10.  
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outlawed secession from Serbia and the FRY respectively,
86
 thereby combining to 
preclude the possibility of Kosovo gaining either independent statehood or the status 
of a republic within the FRY but independent of Serbia.  
Kosovo opposed these changes strongly, and a defining moment in this campaign 
of resistance came on 2 July 1990 with a political declaration by the Parliament of 
Kosovo which declared the Autonomous Province to be a republic of the Yugoslav 
Federation.
87
 Shortly thereafter the parliament and government of Kosovo were 
dissolved by the Republic of Serbia which in turn led a number of deputies from the 
Kosovo provincial parliament to issue a declaration of independence; this resulted in 
the proclamation of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo on 7 September 1990 
shortly before the adoption of Serbia’s new Constitution. On 22 September 1991, with 
war having broken out in Croatia, an unofficial referendum was held in Kosovo to 
validate this declaration of independence.
88
 Backed by the overwhelmingly positive 
result in the referendum,
89
 the Kosovo Albanian leadership pressed on with its quest 
for independence, holding presidential and parliamentary elections for the ‘Republic 
of Kosova’ on May 24, 1992 which resulted in the election of Ibrahim Rugova of the 
LDK as President.
90
 This attempt by Kosovo Albanians to implement their unilateral 
declaration of independence led first, to a boycott by most Kosovo Albanians of both 
Serbian and FRY elections, and secondly to the establishment of institutions by the 
self-styled Republic, which now operated a separate system of public administration 
running parallel to the Serbian system in a very elaborate process of civil 
disobedience.
91
 Following these developments, relations between Kosovo and both 
Serbian and Federal authorities in Belgrade effectively broke down, leading 
ultimately by the spring of 1998 to the armed conflict which prompted the diplomatic 
initiatives of this period.  
It is important again to contextualise these constitutional upheavals, and the way in 
which they presaged the military conflict of the late 1990s, within the broader theatre 
of the West’s involvement. The deterioration of relations between Belgrade and 
Kosovo took place over a ten year period in which the international community was 
elsewhere heavily involved in the detritus of Yugoslavia’s collapse. As such, those 
international organisations which became involved from March 1998 onwards were 
fully aware that the sense of injustice felt by Kosovo Albanians was a direct result of 
both the constitutional centralisation practised by Belgrade since 1989 and the 
disproportionate outcome of the Badinter process which had failed to offer Kosovo 
any practical succour. Despite the lip-service offered to Kosovo’s right to internal 
self-determination, it was clear that Belgrade, able to hide behind its territorial 
integrity, had in effect carte blanche to ignore the EC’s plaintive demands for 
Kosovar autonomy; Milošević could rely upon the uti possidetis rule applied in 1991-
                                               
86 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 1990, Arts. 4 and 44; 1992 Constitution Article 3, 38 and 42. 
87 Surroi, note 71 above, 150.  
88 The referendum was conducted between 26 and 30 September 1991 and was largely clandestine. 
89 Of 1,051,357 eligible voters, 87% participated and 99.87% voted for an independent Republic of 
Kosovo. See International Crisis Group, Kosovo Report, 10 March 1998; Miranda Vickers, Between 
Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 251-2; 
Kumbaro note 14 above, 39. Rehn, note 77 above, Chapter II(c) also confirms that over 90% of those 
taking part opted for independence. 
90 His party is reported to have polled 76.4% of the vote in the unofficial election. International Crisis 
Group, note 89 above, 12. 
91 Vickers, note 89 above, 251-264 and Kofos, note 3 above, 72-76. This government attempted to 
function abroad, see International Crisis Group at 15, but its real influence has been perceived to be 
marginal, Ibid. 73.  
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2 which did nothing to mitigate, and thereby could be seen tacitly to approve, 
Belgrade’s earlier policy of constitutional centralisation.92 
Therefore, in spite of its status as an Autonomous Province of the Republic of 
Serbia under the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo was not eligible to apply to the Badinter 
Commission for recognition; and for Kosovars, conscious of the autonomy they had 
enjoyed under the 1974 Constitution, (which in their eyes accorded Kosovo de facto 
republican status), and bearing in mind that Kosovo with a population which was 
approximately 90% ethnic Albanian was the most ethnically homogeneous 
autonomous unit in the Federal Republic apart from Slovenia, it seemed particularly 
unjust that Kosovo should be excluded from any possibility of statehood simply on 




This also brings us back to the question of self-determination. For Kumbaro who 
saw in SC Res. 1160 and subsequent resolutions a recognition that Kosovars 
constituted a people with a right of internal self-determination, this constitutional 
process constituted a denial of this right.
94
 From this she concludes that Kosovo 
Albanians are entitled to invoke the ‘saving clause’ of the General Assembly 
‘Declaration on Friendly Relations’ which, she argues, “recognises a right to external 
self-determination if a people is completely denied from (sic) meaningfully exerting 
the right to self-determination internally.”95 A similar argument is presented by the 
IIC in its Follow Up Report of 2001 which reiterates the argument made in the Report 
of 2000 that Kosovo is entitled to ‘conditional independence’. This argument is based 
on, “a normative foundation: namely, the case for self-determination arises from the 
systematic abuse of the human rights of Kosovo Albanians over a long period and the 
consequent withdrawal of the consent of the Kosovar Albanians to Serbian rule.”96  
It seems, therefore, that the Kosovo crisis highlights more than many other case 
studies the inconsistencies and the lack of principle within application of the right of 
self-determination as it has been applied since the end of the Second World War. As 
critics have argued, when a viable, culturally differentiated group is unable to escape 
an oppressive state, particularly when other less homogeneous groups have been able 
to do so due either to their successful use of force, or to an arbitrary application of the 
uti possidetis principle by states exercising their power of recognition, then a major 
question concerning the legitimacy of the principle of self-determination as presently 
applied arises. 
 
c. The Rambouillet Process 
 
In a sense then, both the disadvantageous outcome which resulted for Kosovo from 
the EC Arbitration process, and the constitutional changes in Serbia and the FRY 
which served to aggravate this outcome, may help explain why the international 
                                               
92 Kumbaro, note 14 above, 37, and IIC Report, note 4 above, 55-6. 
93 A distinction described by Tim Judah as “constitutional sophistry” Judah, note 52 above, 37. On the 
attitudes of Kosovars to this perceived injustice see Surroi, note 71 above, 162 and 168. 
94 Kumbaro, note 14 above, 41-2. 
95 This is a reference to UN General Assembly Declaration 2625 which in a general commitment to the 
territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign and independent states hints that a state’s 
entitlement to territorial integrity might be weakened if the state is not conducting itself, “in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”, and specifically 
where it is not, “possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour”. 
96 The Follow-up to the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence?, IIC (2001), 10. 
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response to the Kosovo crisis involved a diplomatic effort not only to restore peace 
and alleviate humanitarian problems, but also to bring about a detailed constitutional 
settlement which would restore to Kosovo the extensive powers of self government it 
had lost since 1989. It is difficult to conclude that considerations like those which 
preoccupied the Independent Report were not also at work in motivating Western 
governments as they made strenuous efforts to reach an autonomy solution for 
Kosovo. The international  initiative begun in March 1998 became nothing less than 
an attempt to impose an overall constitutional settlement which would restore 
Kosovo’s autonomy to at least its pre-1990 position, and in doing so, perhaps undo 
some of the injustice Kosovo felt with regard to the Badinter process and the 
unfulfilled assurances of minority rights and internal self-determination which it had 
purported to deliver. This is evident if we return to our account of events towards the 
end of 1998. Although the aftermath of the October Agreements and of SC Res. 1203 
initially saw a stabilisation in the situation on the ground with a cautious welcome 
accorded to it by both sides,
97
 things soon began to deteriorate and in particular, the 
November dead-lines for electoral rules etc. were not met.
98
 
From the beginning of 1999 ominous signs of a breakdown in the political process 
began to appear; by the end of 1998 little progress had been made and by January 
1999 Western patience was wearing thin particularly as occasional atrocities 
continued to be committed by the security forces.
99
 However, although the political 
agreement brokered by Holbrooke fell apart, it would be wrong to say that there was a 
sudden lurch towards humanitarian catastrophe; rather it was the failure of the 
political deal hatched in October which seemed to set in motion the final diplomatic 
push for a solution to the crisis. NATO held an emergency meeting on January 17,
100
 
which was followed by a Contact Group meeting of January 22, and a call to both 
sides to come to peace talks soon followed. At a subsequent meeting on January 29, 
the Contact Group summoned representatives from the FRY, Serbia and the Kosovo 
Albanians to meet at Rambouillet by February 6, “to begin negotiations with the 
direct involvement of the Contact Group.”101 This call, backed by a threat of NATO 
                                               
97 UN Doc. S/1998/1068 (12 November 1998) paras. 6-11.  
98 By the end of December, there was still no progress on reaching a political settlement despite the 
deadline of 9 November having come and gone. The Secretary-General reported, “alarming signs of 
potential deterioration”. UN Doc. S/1998/1221 (24 December 1998), para. 4, and that violence had 
reached its highest level since the October 16 Agreement. Similarly the humanitarian problems 
remained very severe with the UNHCR estimating that 200,000 people remained displaced within 
Kosovo. Ibid. para. 7.  
99 The build up to the Rambouillet process and the final ultimatum from NATO which eventually 
triggered air strikes can be traced to a massacre reported on 16 January 1999 where at least forty five 
people from the village of Racak near Pristina were reported to have been killed by the security forces. 
President Clinton declared: “This was a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder designed to sow 
fear among the people of Kosovo... it is a clear violation of the commitments the Serbian authorities 
have made to NATO. There can be no justification for it.” US Ambassador William Walker, the head 
of the OSCE force monitoring the cease-fire also accused Serbian security forces of mass murder. 
“Villagers Slaughtered in Kosovo ‘Atrocity’ Scores Dead in Bloodiest Spree of Conflict,” The 
Washington Post, 17 January 1999. For reports of earlier violence on both sides see also OSCE Press 
Release No. 78/98, 15 December 1998, and U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, 
Statement, 18 December 1998. 
100 “US: NATO Set To Strike Vs. Serbs,” Associated Press (18 January 1999). The OSCE also held an 
emergency meeting on 18 January, “Kosovo Massacre: OSCE Calls Emergency Meeting,” Associated 
Free Press, 18 January 1999.  
101 Contact Group statement, London, 29 January 1999. On the background to this meeting see, “Big 
Powers To Summon Kosovo Sides To Peace Talks,” Reuters, 26 January 1999; “US Discloses Plan To 
Impose Kosovo Settlement,” Reuters, 27 January 1999.  
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 was again hedged in the language of humanitarian problems, with 
the statement of 30 January issued by the NAC suggesting that NATO’s strategy was 
designed to avert a, “humanitarian catastrophe”.103 What is remarkable about this final 
attempt to broker a settlement is that, as talks got under way at Rambouillet in France 
in February, both sides were presented with what amounted to a virtual fait accompli: 
a detailed agreement, which included a fully detailed autonomy model for Kosovo, 
and provision for an international peacekeeping force in the region, which both sides 
were expected to accept. Furthermore, this was backed up by the threat of force 
directed in particular at the FRY side. As a Washington spokesman put it: “If the 
Serbs fail to agree to the ... plan and the Kosovar Albanians do… the Serbs will be 
subject to air strikes".
104
 Tim Judah’s laconic summation of the situation was: “both 
sides were being told: ‘Sign or die.’”105After weeks of negotiation the Kosovo 
Albanian side did indeed sign an agreement on 18 March and the FRY’s refusal to do 
so led directly to air-strikes, following a final intervention by the OSCE,
106
 
commencing on March 24 in Operation Allied Force.
107
  
Perhaps more than any other initiative over the previous twelve months, the 
Rambouillet process highlights the Western preoccupation with Kosovan autonomy. It 
emerged at a time when the refugee situation was getting worse but in other ways the 
situation on the ground was arguably less serious than it had been in the late 
summer/autumn of 1998.
108
 Furthermore, it provided a programme of detailed 
autonomy for Kosovo, but only for three years, stating that: “Three years after the 
entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to 
determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of 
the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the 
implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a 
comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider 
proposals by any Party for additional measures”.109 Despite the commitment to 
                                               
102 At the same time NATO issued fresh warnings, and expressed its preparedness to back with force 
the final political initiative launched by the Contact Group on 29 January. Javier Solana announced, 
“NATO stands ready to act and rules out no option... The North Atlantic Council has decided to 
increase its military preparedness to ensure that the demands of the international community are met.” 
Hence an ultimatum was issued to both sides that they must agree to meet for peace talks within a week 
or face the consequences. “NATO Warns Both Sides in Kosovo,” Reuters, 28 January 1999; “Major 
Powers To Give Ultimatum On Kosovo,” Reuters, 29 January 1999. 
103 On 30 January, the NAC agreed that Secretary-General Solana could authorise air strikes against 
targets on Yugoslav territory. He stated, “NATO stands ready to act. We rule out no option to ensure 
full respect by both sides in Kosovo for the requirements of the international community”. Statement 
by NATO Secretary-General, NATO Headquarters, 30 January 1999. 
104 “Washington Renews Warnings to Serbs over Accepting Kosovo Agreement,” Associated Free 
Press, 10 February 1999. 
105 Judah, note FILL IN above, 233. 
106 The OSCE reported that Chairman-in-Office Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek, 
telephoned President Milošević on 24 March  and urged him to accept the Rambouillet interim 
agreement and put an end to the excessive use of force by FRY and Serbian forces in Kosovo. OSCE 
Press Release, Vienna, 26 March 1999. 
107 Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General announced the commencement of air operations against the 
FRY on March 24. NATO Press Release (1999) 041, 24 March 1999. For a discussion of the 
Rambouillet process and the agreement see Weller, note 56 above. 
108 The IIC Report notes the lack of verified data at this time, but still concludes, “apart from the 
shocking exception of the Recak/Racak [applying both Albanian and Serb place names] massacre, it is 
reasonable to assume that the number of civilian killings was significantly lower… than during earlier 
months.” ICC Report, note 4 above, 83. 
109 Chapter 8, Article 1(3). 
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Kosovar autonomy, reference to the Helsinki Final Act once again illustrates the 
West’s ambivalence on the self-determination question, in particular on the question 
of statehood for Kosovo. On the one hand, on offer was a final solution in three years 
which Kosovar nationalists hoped would lead to independence, but the reference to 
the Helsinki Final Act was a reminder of the commitment in that document to the 
territorial integrity of existing states.  
Nonetheless it is notable that air-strikes commenced in direct consequence of the 
failure of the FRY to sign the agreement. Although the language of justification was 
couched in humanitarian terms (and humanitarian concerns were certainly real with 
the UNHCR reporting on 19 March that 250,000 persons in Kosovo were still 
displaced), it seems that references to humanitarian problems were also instrumental 
in that they served as legal justification for military intervention.
110
 Also crucial to the 
commencement of bombing was the collapse of Rambouillet, the importance of which 
is seemingly borne out by the recollections of Richard Holbrooke from his last 
meeting with Slobodan Milošević shortly before the bombing started. As Judah notes: 
“Instead of mentioning that tens of thousands were again in flight, he says he told 
Milosevic that Serbia would be bombed: ‘if you don’t change your position, if you 
don’t agree to negotiate and accept Rambouillet as the basis of the negotiation.”111 
This leads Judah to conclude that the West’s motives were mixed: “The humanitarian 
catastrophe was a part of the reason but the other part was a modern-day version of 
gun-boat diplomacy.”112 Gun-boat diplomacy, it is submitted, which had as its 
primary aim an autonomy settlement for Kosovo. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The Kosovo intervention suggests that the Badinter process has cast a long shadow 
with its application of the uti possidetis principle and with recognition being accorded 
exclusively to sub-state constitutional republics as Yugoslavia dissolved.
113
 This 
restriction has sown predictable seeds. The war in Bosnia was one, and the endless 
machinations over the final status for Kosovo is another. As the international 
community attempts to arrive at a final status for Kosovo today the Badinter process 
hangs over it. But this is not to suggest the issue is anything but complex. Even those 
who advocate recognising Kosovo as an independent state are mindful of the need to 
provide adequate protections for the minority rights of non-Albanians are 
guaranteed.
114
 But these critics of the EC approach to recognition and of its 
                                               
110 Judah, note 52 above, 233. 
111 Ibid. 233. 
112 Ibid. 233. What is also notable is that the Security Council seemed to support the Rambouillet 
initiative; when the Contact Group issued its demand on 29 January 1999 that the parties meet at 
Rambouillet, this was supported by a Security Council Presidential statement on the same day. UN 
Security Council Presidential Statement, 29 January 1999. See Weller, note 56 above, 222. The Contact 
Group statement of 29 January  had also repeated the demands that the FRY comply with existing 
Security Council resolutions. 
113 For example, the contrasting fortunes of the self-confident, internationally-active, EU Member State 
Slovenia and those of Kosovo remain today very stark. 
114 Kumbaro, note 14 above; IIC Report, note 4 above. See also the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee Report which states: “Independence is… out of the question until the safety of Kosovo’s 
minorities can be guaranteed.” (emphasis added), HC Foreign Affairs Committee Fourth Report, 27 
March 2001, para. 138; and again: “independence should be ruled out until the other elements of 
UNSCR 1244 have been achieved – in particular a ‘safe environment for all the people in Kosovo’[i.e. 
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implications for Kosovo have marshalled the principle of self-determination in 
forming their arguments. Kumbaro’s contention that Kosovar Albanians as a people 
are entitled to external self-determination given that the internal manifestation of this 
right has been so egregiously denied by the FRY, has been noted above.
115
 Kumbaro 
finds the legal basis for this assertion in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. A 
similar approach was taken by the IIC Report which makes no explicit reference to 
the UN declaration but which, in substantive terms, offers a similar argument to 
Kumbaro’s: “it is important to emphasise the normative case for Kosovo’s 
independence. In legal terms, the case for self-determination of Kosovar Albanians 
arises for systematic abuse of human rights over a long period.”116 This led the IIC to 
recommend ‘conditional independence’ for Kosovo,117 and we saw how prominent 
states began to move their positions in this direction. The British House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee Report, for example, in 2001 offered cautious 
encouragement: “This is in many ways an attractive model, although we know of no 
precedent for such an arrangement.”118 
The application of a right of external self-determination to Kosovar Albanians does 
not, according to either Kumbaro or the IIC, necessarily raise the age-old Pandora’s 
Box threat of widespread secession.
119
 Kumbaro’s reference to the Friendly Relations 
Declaration suggests that for her, Kosovo represents an extreme case of human rights 
abuses, and that Kosovo’s entitlement to exercise external self-determination is not 
one likely to be shared by many other sub-state peoples throughout the world. The IIC 
Report was explicit on this point; referring to the, “systematic abuse of human rights 
over a long period”.120 The Report continues: “The same claim cannot be made by 
Serbs in Bosnia or by Albanians in Macedonia. Indeed, any group that has the 
temerity to claim that its situation is comparable to that experienced by Kosovar 
Albanians before 1999, as in Macedonia for example, should be sharply 
disabused.”121  
Nonetheless, as Kosovo moves towards full recognition as an independent state 
questions are being raised as to whether or not the international community is taking a 
wider approach to the self-determination principle than the vigorous delimitation of 
this principle through the post-war colonial model would seem to permit. It would 
also suggest that the act of recognition of a new state can itself be an instrument of 
                                                                                                                                      
1244 Annex 2.4].” (para. 143). Ironically, this was the very same proviso attached to provisional 
recognition of Croatia by Badinter – Arbitration Commission, Opinion on the Recognition of the 
Republic of Croatia by the European Community and its Member States, Opinion No.5, International 
Legal Materials 31 (1992): 1505. See also Laponce, note 25 above. 
115 Kumbaro, note 14 above, 39 and 48. 
116 IIC, note 96 above, 15. This conclusion highlights a possibly emerging relationship between the 
recognition criteria applied in 1991 and the Friendly Relations Declaration. If in terms of the 1991 
criteria, a state should only be recognised if it respects human rights (in particular, minority rights), this 
seems to bolster the arguments of those who, in reading the Friendly Relations Declaration argue that it 
implies that a state might forfeit its territorial integrity in respect of an internal people possessed of a 
right to internal self-determination which it systematically denies them. 
117 IIC, note 4 above, 9-10. 
118 HC Report 27 March 2001, para. 139. 
119 Thomas Franck’s nightmare world of 2000 states. Thomas Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and 
Society in the Age of Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chapter 2. Indeed the 
declaration of independence issued by Kosovo states; ‘Observing that Kosovo is a special case arising 
from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation…’. 
120 IIC, note 96 above, 15. 
121 Ibid.  
Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2013/10 




 This scenario begins to beg the question whether we might see within 
international customary law the emergence of a limited right of secession perhaps 
along the lines advocated by Hurst Hannum who argues that: “such a right should be 
supported, but only under very narrow conditions. These conditions might include 
situations where secession is the only plausible response to continuing, massive, 
discriminatory human rights violations (arguably the case for Kurds in Iraq and 
Turkey in the 1980s and Tibetans in China during the Cultural Revolution) or where 
secession might be employed retroactively as a means of punishing egregious 
violations of humanitarian law (as occurred in Kosovo).”123 This idea of a right 
emerging under this latter scenario, as a punitive device, seems unlikely given the 
vehement opposition to Kosovo’s secession by a number of states124, and indeed 
highly incommensurable with the existing principle of self-determination; in addition, 
it would lead to an even greater politicisation of the law of self-determination than 
that which already prevails. Instead, if a wider approach to the external application of 
the self-determination principle is to emerge, the scenario offered by both Kumbaro 
and the IIC would seem to offer the basis for a more principled way to proceed, and 
one which more faithfully reflects the spirit of the Friendly Relations Declaration. 
Certainly the present position in Kosovo seems untenable as was recognised a 
decade ago.
125
 The paradox today is that Western intervention was clearly motivated, 
at least in part, by the removal of Kosovo’s autonomy by Belgrade, but that, with 
Belgrade’s authority over Kosovo effectively ended, the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in effect performed the role of 
preserving the FRY’s technical territorial integrity in the face of a clear desire for 
independence by Kosovar Albanians. The West, having struggled for so long to 
restore Kosovo’s autonomy from the grip of constitutional centralisation, was left 
with the task of trying to secure the FRY’s territorial integrity in the face of de facto 
independence for Kosovo on the ground; a position which ten years on is 
unsustainable.  
Ultimately the reasons behind Western determination to secure autonomy for 
Kosovo are complex. The most important factor seems to have been the history of 
Yugoslavia over the past decade in which the West has been so heavily embroiled, but 
this does not provide a complete answer. Another factor, and one with potentially 
wider implications, is a growing sense, certainly within Europe, that national 
minorities are entitled to better recognition of their rights as minorities, and perhaps 
even to a right of autonomy. Various instruments have made a move in this direction: 
for example, the CSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990;
126
 the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995; and the Lund 
Recommendations on Effective Participation by National Minorities in Political Life, 
adopted in 1999.
127
 These initiatives which were being implemented at the same time 
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as Belgrade was consolidating its grip on Kosovo made the removal of that province’s 
autonomy even more embarrassing for the European powers – particularly as they 
were still smarting over their failures in Bosnia.
128
 It seems therefore, that one of the 
long-term implications of the Kosovo intervention is the consolidation of a growing 
European commitment to the rights of internal minorities; in this context the final 
solution to Kosovo’s status when it comes may bring with a wider and more 
expansive approach, at least within Europe, to the right of autonomy for national 
minorities. 
 
                                               
128 Paradoxically the initiative of promoting autonomy for national minorities as in the Lund 
Recommendations, may in fact have been undermined by the Badinter process. For example, unitary 
states may now be very wary of introducing federal arrangements given that it was their status as 
federal republics in both the USSR and SFRY which permitted territories to apply for recognition as 
independent states, as these two federations collapsed. Indeed throughout the negotiations on Kosovo’s 
future, Belgrade was reluctant to concede republican status to Kosovo by way of a so-called ‘three 
republic’ solution, one reason being that it was felt that republican status would be used by Kosovo as a 
stepping stone to full independence. 
